The “Megali idea” (meaning Great Idea) is the ideology on which the national goals and aspirations of modern Greece were based. The term itself was first used by Greek Prime Minister John Kolettis in the early 1840’s, although the concept itself originated in the thirteenth century following the Latin-Frankish conquest and occupation of Constantinople. After the exile of the legitimate Greek Emperor to Nicea (and other claimants to the throne establishing themselves in Epirus and Trebizond), the liberation of Constantinople was the primary aim of the Greeks.
According to Apostolos Vacolopoulos, the Latin-Frankish invasion and occupation of the Greek capital led to a major national awakening throughout the Greek speaking world. Constantinople was liberated by Emperor Michael VIII in 1261 but was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Constantinople once more became the object of desire in the minds of the Greeks.
In 1821, a national reawakening after centuries of Ottoman occupation led to Greek independence. Despite the complexities caused by the blatant interference of the western powers in Greek internal affairs, the Greeks had a very firm belief in their national purpose which was expressed in the “Megali Idea”. This goal was generally the liberation of Greeks outside the borders of the new Greek Kingdom and the liberation of Constantinople specifically.
The “Megali Idea” was successful in that Greece managed to incorporate the Ionian Islands (1864), Thessaly, (1881) Crete, Macedonia, and Epirus (1912-13), Western Thrace and the aegean islands (1923) and the Dodecanese islands (1947). The efforts to liberate Asia Minor and Constantinople were a failure owing to the downfall of Prime Minister Venizelos and the restoration of the Monarchy which caused Great Britain and France to shift their support from the Greeks to Kemal’s Turks.
It is necessary to discuss the period preceding the downfall of Venizelos. The great man came to reflect the interests and aspirations of the Greek nation. He was charismatic, intelligent, and a strong nationalist with great diplomatic skills and abilities. Speaking before the Greek Parliament, Venizelos mentioned that Ottoman Turkey had “a clearly outlined policy for the extermination of the Greek race”. Under Venizelos, Greek interests predominated in the formation of foreign policy and relations with the west were undertaken based on their compatibility with those interests.
After returning to power in 1917 following his dispute with the Monarchy, Venizelos aligned Greece with Great Britain and France. In return, Greece was given territorial rights in Smyrna and Eastern Thrace. This is the period in history which should be a model for Greek foreign policy. That Greece was defeated in Asia Minor is not important here as that defeat was caused by later political developments and their consequences that were entirely avoidable.
In 1919, Venizelos submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference in France which referred to the historical and moral claims that Greece had on the unredeemed territories of the then Ottoman Empire. It makes for fascinating reading as does the whole period of the Venizelist era. There are some historically invaluable works from that period which attest to the very prominent position that Greece had achieved.
In 1920, a prominent observer of political events in Greece and Asia Minor named Herbert Adams Gibbons published a biography of Venizelos. The final paragraph of the book published before the fatal downfall of Venizelos is excerpted here,
“Adrianople and Smyrna are stepping stones to Constantinople. Students of the Italian risorgimento maintain that the movement could not have ended elsewhere than in Rome. The renascence of Hellenism cannot end elsewhere than in Constantinople. How long it will take to achieve the unity of Hellas depends upon the Greek people. If they continue to give their support to Venizelos, he will know how to lead the Greek army to its final victory. The powers may interpose their veto. But the life of Venizelos demonstrates the folly of vetoes. In the prayer of eight million Greeks, “Zeto Venizelos!” the aspirations of Hellenism are practically expressed. For if the Cretan lives, and continues to lead, he will accomplish what the greatest Mediterranean islander before him failed to accomplish. He will take possession of Constantinople.”
Gibbons himself was a great friend of Greece who later submitted reports to the Christian Science Monitor about the genocide of the Greek populations by the Kemalists.
Greece during that particular time had a strong nationalist oriented foreign policy. One century later, it is inconceivable to ponder any possibility of Greek expansionism. If there were to be a “Megali Idea” of the twenty first century the primary aim would be to gain the diplomatic and political support of the United States and/or the Russian Federation. Whereas a century ago, Athens was on the offensive against Turkey, the post Lausanne realities require Greek diplomatic and political action against Ankara to be strictly defensive.
Much mention has been made of the city of Constantinople in this analysis. While Constantinople is long gone, the great spiritual and cultural heritage that the City represents is very much alive. One thousand years ago, Constantinople was the capital of the Greek world and under the rule of the great Basil II (976-1025).
During the reign of Emperor Alexios Comnenus of Constantinople, the European Crusaders passed through the City on their way to Jerusalem. The westerners were amazed at the splendor of the Greek Capital. In those days, the Greeks looked on the Europeans as barbarians and loathed them.
This brings to mind tw0 events that occurred during the tenure of the late Archbishop of Athens and all Greece Christodoulos (1998-2008). The first events consisted of rallies called by the Archbishop in Thessaloniki and Athens to protest the Simitis government’s plans to remove religion from identity cards. The cards were a trivial issue, as the real issue had to do with Greece’s Byzantine past and independence vs the Europeanization and secularization of Greece at the expense of its Helleno-Orthodox identity and traditional goals.
The second event I am recalling had to do with the visit of Pope John Paul II to Athens in 2001. The Simitis government accepted the Papal request to visit Athens without consulting the Church. More important than the visit itself was the way in which the Church and the Government each viewed the visit. Objections to the visit may have been primarily ecclesiastical, but there were also historical and national tensions at play.
Pope John Paul II apologized to the Church of Greece for the Fourth Crusade which destroyed Constantinople in 1204. For the advocates of Europeanization this history was completely irrelevant. For the Church and its conservative allies this was a matter of remembering the history of the “ethnos” or nation. The Fourth Crusade and its fifty seven year occupation fatally weakened the Greeks and made it impossible for them to resist the slow but irreversible advance of the Ottoman Turks.
The importance of history to the national survival of the Greek nation-state cannot be stressed too much. What is a nation if it forgets its own history and the misfortunes that it has suffered in the past? An example can be found in the events of the summer of 2015 which transpired under the government of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras.
At the height of the economic crisis the Greek negotiations with Europe reminded one of the Greeks who travelled to Florence in 1439 to unite the Greek Church with the Latins in the belief that this would save Constantinople. In 2015, the Greek efforts to gain understanding from Europe ended in failure. After the “OXI” referendum held under the auspices of Syriza the Greek banks ended up being closed and the Greeks rediscovered how much the Europeans loved them.
This analysis has spent more time on history than was originally intended or conceived. Nonetheless, this is extremely important. When the Greeks are weak, they are alone. That was the case in 1439 when the Greeks humiliated themselves by accepting the faith of the Latins for help which was never to arrive. It was also the case in 1922, when the Europeans, the United States, and the Russian Bolsheviks all supported Kemal’s forces in Asia Minor.
Even in the aftermath of the slaughter at Smyrna, the western powers were merciless to the Greeks. The Treaty of Lausanne legalized the genocide of the previous decade and further legitimized the ethnic cleansing of over 1,000,000 Greeks from Asia Minor. Had later Greek governments been cognizant of this history they might not have let Greece fall into economic misery and be at the mercy of the powerful yet again.
One more comparison of recent times with the historical past must be made. In the decades that preceded the Fall of Constantinople the Greeks were caught between the west and the Ottomans in the east. The Franks from the west and the Ottoman advances that seized more and more Greek territory until they got closer and closer to the Capital.
Today, Greece is caught between the west which is led by the United States (heir to the Franks) and which has instigated wars against Iraq and Syria, and by Erdogan’s Turkey (heir to the Ottomans) in the east. Centuries ago, the Greek world paid heavily for the Crusades that were waged by the west. Today, Greece pays mostly for the western intervention in Syria. Greece has been forced to accept large numbers of refugees from Syria as a result of a war that Athens neither desired nor participated in.
Most of the refugees are without question there for humanitarian purposes and it is to their credit that Greeks have risen to the occasion and treated them well and provided them with shelter, food, and medicine. But at the same time how can Greece be expected to take in an unlimited number of refugees? Greece is once again caught between a west which pursues policies that have devastating consequences for the Greek world and expansionistic Turkish power.
Greece cannot retrieve its lost homelands, but it can retrieve its history, its sovereignty, and its ethos. For many years, attempts have been made to cleanse Greece of its history. A perfect example has been the attempt to rewrite Greek history as it pertained to the Greek genocide in Smyrna. In his book, “Greece The Hidden Centuries”, David Brewer writes, “In September 2006 the Greek government introduced a new school history textbook for twelve-year olds, covering Greek history from 1453 to the present”. Further down, Brewer writes, “But all the textbook has to say of the event (the slaughter at Smyrna) is “The Turkish Army enters Smyrna. Thousands of Greeks crowd at the port and try to leave for Greece.”
This was just one example of the falsification of history that was introduced into Greek textbooks. Other examples of the falsification of history include denial of the existence of secret schools in the Ottoman Empire and the denial of the forced kidnapping of boys for the Janissaries. And this is done in the name of liberalization and enlightenment. It is in fact undemocratic and a form of fascism.
Returning to the point that Greek diplomatic and political action must be defensive. As has been pointed out in part one of this analysis, Turkey has questioned the validity of the Treaty of Lausanne and is questioning Greek sovereignty of the islands. Erdogan overthrew the Kemalist regime which does have benefits as pointed out in part one. Therefore, a carefully considered response to Erdogan’s Turkey should model itself on the foreign policy of the era of Venizelos.
The Venizelos quote cited above demonstrates that under his leadership, Greek foreign policy had been fully Hellenized. This unfortunately is not the case today. The Hellenization of Greek foreign policy necessitates that European and NATO interests take a back seat to the greater interests of Cyprus, the Aegean, and the islands. Certainly, an alliance with Europe, America, and NATO is welcome but on the condition that they support Greece’s rights and interests above and beyond those of Turkey. European support for the effort by Greece to defend its border last February is most certainly a political and diplomatic success and a step in the right direction.
At the apogee of the reign of the Kemalists in Turkey, Ankara acquired near political invincibility. It’s strategic value began with its proximity to the Soviet Union and increased as a result of political developments on its borders such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. Its alliance with Israel had gradually developed and grown and Ankara could count on the support of the Israeli government and its lobby in Washington.
The policies of the Erdogan government have destroyed those diplomatic achievements and alliances. Turkey’s former advantage could become Greece’s advantage. What the west found advantageous in Turkey in the past, is becoming increasingly disadvantageous today and in the future.
Greek relations with Russia are just as important, if not more important for Athens. The standing of the Greeks in the Orthodox world has suffered considerably as a result of certain ecclesiastical developments (which have been critiqued elsewhere on this blog and in any case fall outside the scope of this summary and analysis). A separate post on Greece and Russia will eventually follow.
In conclusion, modern Greece has always succeeded when its national interests were pursued front and center (the war of independence, Balkan Wars etc) and did not take a back seat to the interests of the great powers when their interests conflicted with Hellenic interests. Greek foreign policy has been seriously constrained by its membership in both NATO and the European Union.
While Greece remains a member in both, its foreign policy should revert to the era before Athens was admitted into NATO, especially the Venizelist era.
Sources
American Hellenic Society. Greece Before the Peace Congress of 1919. A Memorandum Dealing With The Rights of Greece Submitted by Eleutherios Venizelos Prime Minister of Greece.1919.
Brewer, David. Greece the Hidden Centuries. I.B. Taurus. 2010.
Clogg, Richard. A Concise History of Greece Second Edition. 2002. Cambridge University Press. Page 47.
Gibbons, Herbert Adams. Venizelos. Houghton Mifflin Company. 1920.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece Service of Historical Archives. The Foundation of the Modern Greek State Major Treaties and Conventions (1830-1947). Kastaniotis Editions. 1999.
Vacolopoulos, Apostolos E. Origins of the Greek Nation 1204-1461. 1970 Rutgers University Press. Page 35.
Xanthaky, Socrates A. and Sakellarios, Nicholas G. Greece in her true light. Her position In the World-Wide War as Expounded by El. K. Venizelos. 1916.